Two Wrongs Make a Right

Two Wrongs Make a Right

This fallacy assumes that because an unethical act has been committed, committing the same act again will somehow correct the initial unethical behavior. Simply repeating wrong behavior does not make it right. The core of the fallacy occurs when a person attempts to justify an action against another because the other person did take, or would take, the same action against him or her. Its structure can be formalized as:

• Person A does action X to Person B.
• Person B does action X to Person A (or would do so).
• Therefore, Person B’s action is justified.

The phrase “two wrongs make a right” suggests an arithmetic metaphor: 2 wrongs = 1 right. Or, 1 wrong + 1 wrong = 1 right. The familiar warning “two wrongs don’t make a right,” often used to discourage playground retaliation, challenges that inference. A prior wrong alone does not establish that a response is justified. This leaves a separate question: is the response itself a wrong, or is there an independent reason to permit it?

Examples of the Fallacy in Everyday Reasoning

Many everyday arguments rely on this flawed assumption:

• Jimmy steals Tommy’s lunch. Tommy then steals Jimmy’s lunch. While it was wrong for Jimmy to steal, it is not sound reasoning to claim that Tommy stealing Jimmy’s lunch makes the situation right. What remains are two kids who steal, with no better understanding of why they shouldn’t.
• A customer is overcharged by a waiter and responds by withholding the tip, reasoning that the waiter would have undercharged himself if given the chance. Even if the assumption about the waiter were true, two rip-offs don’t make the situation right.
• Sharon: “Why do you keep lying to your husband?” Amanda: “Because he has been lying to me for years.” Amanda’s husband’s deception does not transform her own lies into truthful or ethical acts.
• Jim: “How can you live with yourself, knowing that you have killed five people?” Gene: “The state kills people every day; it’s called the death penalty!” Gene appeals to a system of institutionalized retaliation, but the existence of capital punishment does not make his individual act of killing justified.
• Alex: “Aren’t you going to return the wallet you found?” Harvey: “Why should I? When I lost my wallet, no one returned mine!” Harvey’s own past loss does not grant him the right to keep someone else’s property.
• You took my sister’s life, now I will take your sister’s life. The second killing does not undo the first—it merely adds another loss, rooted in revenge rather than justice.

Historical and Legal Roots: Retributive Justice

Discussions of proportionate punishment refer to ancient sources such as the Code of Hammurabi, Exodus, Deuteronomy and Leviticus (24:19–21), including the formulation “eye for eye, tooth for tooth.” The principle of lex talionis, or retaliation in kind, raises questions about what a proportionate response requires. Those questions are distinct from simply assuming that another person’s wrong excuses one’s own.

Retributive theories seek to justify punishment in relation to an offense. Describing imprisonment as “taking his life” does not settle whether it is justified or equivalent to killing. Arguments about imprisonment and the death penalty need premises about punishment, proportionality and the authority to impose it.

An execution following a murder produces another death, but counting deaths does not establish that both acts are wrong or that the second is justified. Invoking “two wrongs make a right” cannot settle the debate. A defense of punishment must supply a justification beyond the fact that an offense occurred.

Beyond Retaliation: Expanding the Pattern

The fallacy extends into many domains, often disguised as balancing the scales. In economic matters, a bank robber might claim that stealing from a bank is justified because the bank’s high interest charges are themselves a form of stealing. The robber tries to equate literal theft with usury, creating a faulty equivalency and a red herring that distracts from the evident equivocation. The related objection attributed here to Hegel asks whether the robber’s conduct is consistent with the property rights he invokes.

In politics, a politician caught lying under oath might point to other politicians who have lied without punishment, drawing on the tu quoque (“you also”) fallacy. Her implied defense is that because others have done it, it is hypocritical to hold her accountable. If it merely diverts attention to others, the response leaves her conduct unjustified. Victor Lasky’s It Didn’t Start with Watergate is cited here in connection with uneven treatment of political wrongdoing. A demand for consistent treatment can be relevant without proving the underlying act right.

The same question can be put to arguments invoking Nazi persecution to justify mistreatment of Palestinians, or the attacks on 9/11 to justify military operations that harm civilians. Assess the particular justification offered; a past atrocity alone does not establish the permissibility of a later act. The slogan “two wrongs make a right” cannot replace that assessment. The leap is from “you did it to me” to “so I can do it to you.” The justification is still missing.

Restorative Justice

Restorative approaches emphasize repairing harm and the needs of victims, offenders and communities. Comparing them with retributive approaches requires examining their aims and justifications. Calling every retributive response a second wrong would assume the conclusion instead of arguing for it.

Why It’s an Informal Fallacy

This is an informal fallacy because assessing it requires attention to the content and context of the justification. Ask whether the earlier wrong is being treated as sufficient permission for the later act, or whether an independent reason has been offered.