The Ubiquity of the Gaussian (Bell Curve)
Taleb argues against treating the Gaussian bell curve as a default description of the world. Where rare outcomes can dominate totals, a standard deviation may conceal important features of risk. The task is to establish where the model fits before relying on it.
THE IDEA
The Ubiquity of the Gaussian
One of the problems I face in life is that whenever I tell people that the Gaussian bell curve is not ubiquitous in real life, only in the minds of statisticians, they require me to 'prove it'—yet nobody has managed to prove the opposite. Whenever I suggest a process that is not Gaussian, I am asked to justify my suggestion and to, beyond the phenomena, 'give them the theory behind it.' We saw in Chapter 14 the rich-get-richer models that were proposed in order to justify not using a Gaussian. Modelers were forced to spend their time writing theories on possible models that generate the scalable—as if they needed to be apologetic about it. Theory shmeory! I have an epistemological problem with that, with the need to justify the world’s failure to resemble an idealized model that someone blind to reality has managed to promote.
My technique, instead of studying the possible models generating non-bell curve randomness, hence making the same errors of blind theorizing, is to do the opposite: to know the bell curve as intimately as I can and identify where it can and cannot hold. I know where Mediocristan is. To me it is frequently (nay, almost always) the users of the bell curve who do not understand it well, and have to justify it, and not the opposite.
This ubiquity of the Gaussian is not a property of the world, but a problem in our minds, stemming from the way we look at it.
I sometimes get a little emotional because I’ve spent a large part of my life thinking about this problem. Since I started thinking about it, and conducting a variety of thought experiments as I have above, I have not for the life of me been able to find anyone around me in the business and statistical world who was intellectually consistent in that he both accepted the Black Swan and rejected the Gaussian and Gaussian tools. Many people accepted my Black Swan idea but could not take it to its logical conclusion, which is that you cannot use one single measure for randomness called standard deviation (and call it 'risk'); you cannot expect a simple answer to characterize uncertainty. To go the extra step requires courage, commitment, an ability to connect the dots, a desire to understand randomness fully. It also means not accepting other people’s wisdom as gospel. Then I started finding physicists who had rejected the Gaussian tools but fell for another sin: gullibility about precise predictive models, mostly elaborations around the preferential attachment of Chapter 14—another form of Platonicity. I could not find anyone with depth and scientific technique who looked at the world of randomness and understood its nature, who looked at calculations as an aid, not a principal aim. It took me close to a decade and a half to find that thinker, the man who made many swans gray: Mandelbrot—the great Benoît Mandelbrot.
[*] The nontechnical (or intuitive) reader can skip this chapter, as it goes into some details about the bell curve. Also, you can skip it if you belong to the category of fortunate people who do not know about the bell curve.
[*] I have fudged the numbers a bit for simplicity’s sake.
[*] One of the most misunderstood aspects of a Gaussian is its fragility and vulnerability in the estimation of tail events. The odds of a 4 sigma move are twice that of a 4.15 sigma. The odds of a 20 sigma are a trillion times higher than those of a 21 sigma! It means that a small measurement error of the sigma will lead to a massive underestimation of the probability. We can be a trillion times wrong about some events.
[†] My main point, which I repeat in some form or another throughout Part Three, is as follows. Everything is made easy, conceptually, when you consider that there are two, and only two, possible paradigms: nonscalable (like the Gaussian) and other (such as Mandelbrotian randomness). The rejection of the application of the nonscalable is sufficient, as we will see later, to eliminate a certain vision of the world. This is like negative empiricism: I know a lot by determining what is wrong.
[*] Note that variables may not be infinitely scalable; there could be a very, very remote upper limit—but we do not know where it is so we treat a given situation as if it were infinitely scalable. Technically, you cannot sell more of one book than there are denizens of the planet—but that upper limit is large enough to be treated as if it didn’t exist. Furthermore, who knows, by repackaging the book, you might be able to sell it to a person twice, or get that person to watch the same movie several times.
[†] As I was revising this draft, in August 2006, I stayed at a hotel in Dedham, Massachusetts, near one of my children’s summer camps. There, I was a little intrigued by the abundance of weight-challenged people walking around the lobby and causing problems with elevator backups. It turned out that the annual convention of NAFA, the National Association for Fat Acceptance, was being held there. As most of the members were extremely overweight, I was not able to figure out which delegate was the heaviest: some form of equality prevailed among the very heavy (someone much heavier than the persons I saw would have been dead). I am sure that at the NARA convention, the National Association for Rich Acceptance, one person would dwarf the others, and, even among the superrich, a very small percentage would represent a large section of the total wealth.
When to use it
Risk management in finance: Understanding that market returns can have fat tails helps avoid underestimating the probability of extreme crashes.
When analyzing wealth or income, examine the upper tail and consider whether a Pareto or another model fits the relevant data and range.
When modeling earthquakes or floods, establish what quantity is being measured and test whether Gaussian assumptions describe the outcomes that matter.
Business forecasting: For products like books or movies, sales often follow a power law; expecting a 'bell curve' can lead to poor inventory and marketing strategies.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
Weight vs. Wealth
Taleb recalls seeing little difference in body weight among the heaviest attendees at a NAFA convention. He imagines a NARA gathering of wealthy people where a single fortune could dwarf the rest. The contrast illustrates his distinction between quantities with tight practical limits and quantities that can vary across a much wider scale.
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
Think of a real-world phenomenon you previously assumed followed a bell curve. Could it actually be scale-invariant? How might that change your understanding of risk?
Why do people instinctively reach for the Gaussian when modeling uncertainty? What cognitive biases might drive this?
How can you identify whether a system lives in Mediocristan (nonscalable) or Extremistan (scalable)? List two distinguishing features for each.
Often confused with
References
- The Fractal Geometry of Nature — Benoît Mandelbrot (1982)
- The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable — Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007)
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- The Black Swan The Impact of the Highly Improbable With a new section On Robustness and Fragility (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)