Iatrogenics (Not Using the Wrong Map)
Taleb uses iatrogenics to describe harm caused by an intervention meant to help. A defective forecast can create false confidence or anchor a decision on a misleading number, making it worse than the decision it was meant to improve.
THE IDEA
NOT USING THE WRONG MAP: THE NOTION OF IATROGENICS
So for now I can produce phronetic rules (in the Aristotelian sense of phronesis, decision-making wisdom). Perhaps the story of my life lies in the following dilemma. To paraphrase Danny Kahneman, for psychological comfort some people would rather use a map of the Pyrénées while lost in the Alps than use nothing at all. They do not do so explicitly, but they actually do worse than that while dealing with the future and using risk measures. They would prefer a defective forecast to nothing. So providing a sucker with a probabilistic measure does a wonderful job of making him take more risks. I was planning to do a test with Dan Goldstein (as part of our general research programs to understand the intuitions of humans in Extremistan). Danny (he is great to walk with, but he does not do aimless strolling, “flâner”) insisted that doing our own experiments was not necessary. There is plenty of research on anchoring that proves the toxicity of giving someone a wrong numerical estimate of risk. Numerous experiments provide evidence that professionals are significantly influenced by numbers that they know to be irrelevant to their decision, like writing down the last four digits of one’s social security number before making a numerical estimate of potential market moves. German judges, very respectable people, who rolled dice before sentencing issued sentences 50 percent longer when the dice showed a high number, without being conscious of it.
When to use it
A financial advisor provides a client with a precise probability of market downturn, leading the client to take excessive risks because the number feels authoritative.
A doctor orders an unnecessary test that yields a false positive, leading to invasive follow-ups that cause more harm than good.
A project manager uses a flawed estimation model to plan deadlines, causing overconfidence and poor resource allocation.
A policy maker adopts a risk measure that gives a false sense of security, leading to inadequate preparation for extreme events.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
The Wrong Map Analogy
Taleb compares a defective forecast with a map of the Pyrénées used while lost in the Alps. The map may feel reassuring while directing attention toward information that does not fit the situation.
Anchoring with Social Security Numbers
Taleb reports experiments in which irrelevant social-security-number digits influenced numerical estimates. The example illustrates anchoring: knowing that a number is irrelevant does not necessarily remove its influence.
German Judges and Dice Rolls
Taleb describes an experiment in which German judges exposed to high dice values gave sentencing estimates 50% longer than those exposed to low values. The claim concerns an experimental anchoring effect rather than a routine courtroom procedure.
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
In what situations have you relied on a flawed forecast or model when a simple heuristic or no model might have been safer?
How might the concept of iatrogenics apply to medical treatments or financial advice where interventions carry hidden risks?
Why do people prefer a defective map to no map? What psychological comfort does it provide, and how can we counteract it?
Often confused with
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- The Black Swan The Impact of the Highly Improbable With a new section On Robustness and Fragility (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)