Alternative Task Construals

ALTERNATIVE TASK CONSTRUALS

An apparent reasoning error may reflect a difference in how the participant and experimenter interpret the task. The experimenter may apply the right standard to the intended problem, while the participant gives an appropriate answer to a different problem (Adler, 1984, 1991; Broome, 1990; Henle, 1962; Hilton, 1995; Levinson, 1995; Margolis, 1987; Schick, 1987, 1997; Schwarz, 1996).

This explanation differs from an occasional lapse in attention. A stable interpretation of the task could produce the same answer when the task is repeated, even if the answer departs from the experimenter’s standard.

It also differs from an explanation based on limited computational capacity. A participant might be able to solve the intended problem but take the wording to mean something else. The researcher then needs to examine which features invite that interpretation.

A further distinction concerns the evaluation standard. The experimenter might use the wrong standard even when both parties understand the problem alike; alternatively, the standard might fit the intended problem but not the one the participant understands. The authors therefore argue that a theory of rationality needs standards for appropriate task interpretations. They contrast this with accounts of means/ends rationality that leave the interpretation unevaluated (Elster, 1983; Nathanson, 1994).

Evaluating task interpretations

Given that principles of rational construal are necessary for a full normative theory of human rationality (Broome, 1990; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Jungermann, 1986; Schick, 1987, 1997; Shweder, 1987; Tversky, 1975), how are such principles to be derived? When searching for principles of rational task construal, the same mechanisms of justification used to assess principles of instrumental rationality are available. Perhaps in some cases – instances where the problem structure maps the world in an unusually close and canonical way – problem construals could be directly evaluated by how well they serve the decision maker in achieving his or her goals (Baron, 1993, 1994). In such cases, it might be possible to prove the superiority or inferiority of certain construals by appeals to Dutch Book or money pump arguments (de Finetti, 1970/1990; Maher, 1993; Skyrms, 1986; Osherson, 1995; Resnik, 1987).

Also available is the expert wide reflective equilibrium view discussed by Stich and Nisbett (1980; see Stanovich, 1999; Stein, 1996). However, note that there are few controversial tasks in the heuristics and biases literature in which all untutored laypersons interpret tasks differently from those of the experts who designed them. The issue is not the untutored average person versus experts, but experts plus some laypersons versus other untutored individuals. The cognitive characteristics of those departing from the expert construal might – for reasons parallel to those argued previously – have implications for how we evaluate particular task interpretations. We contend that Slovic and Tversky’s (1974) assumption (“the deeper the understanding of the axiom, the greater the readiness to accept it”; pp. 372–373) can again be used as a tool to condition the expert reflective equilibrium regarding principles of rational task construal (see Stanovich, 1999; Stein, 1996; Stich & Nisbett, 1980).

Framing effects are ideal vehicles for demonstrating how the understanding/acceptance principle might be utilized. First, it has already been shown that there are consistent individual differences across a variety of framing problems (Frisch, 1993). Second, framing problems have engendered much dispute regarding issues of appropriate task construal. Consider the Disease Problem introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1981):

Problem 1: Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease that is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. Which of the two programs would you favor, Program A or Program B?

Problem 2: Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease that is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die. Which of the two programs would you favor, Program C or Program D?

Many subjects select alternatives A and D in these two problems despite the fact that the two problems are redescriptions of each other and that Program A maps to Program C rather than D. This response pattern violates utility theory’s assumption of descriptive invariance. However, Berkeley and Humphreys (1982) argue that Programs A and C might not be descriptively invariant in subjects’ interpretations. They argue that the wording of the outcome of Program A (“will be saved”) suggests the possibility of saving more lives (see also, Kuhberger, 1995). The wording of the outcome of Program C (“will die”) does not suggest the possibility of saving more lives (indeed, the possibility of losing a few more might be inferred by some people). Under such a construal of the problem, it is no longer nonnormative to choose Programs A and D.

However, consistent with the finding that being forced to provide a rationale or to take more time reduces framing effects (e.g., Larrick et al., 1992; Sieck & Yates, 1997; Takemura, 1994) and that people higher in need for cognition displayed reduced framing effects (Smith & Levin, 1996), in our within-subjects study of framing effects (Stanovich & West, 1998b), we found that individuals giving a consistent response to both descriptions of the disease problem – who were actually the majority in our within-subjects experiment – were significantly higher in cognitive ability than those displaying a framing effect. Taken together, then, findings from the pertinent studies suggest that the response dictated by the construal of the problem originally favored by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) should be considered the correct response because it is endorsed even by untutored subjects as long as they are cognitively engaged with the problem, have enough time to process the information, and have the cognitive ability to fully process the information.

Perhaps no finding in the heuristics and biases literature has been the subject of as much criticism as Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) claim to have demonstrated a conjunction fallacy in probabilistic reasoning. Most of the criticisms have focused on the issue of differential task construal, and several critics have argued that there are alternative construals of the tasks that are, if anything, more rational than that which Tversky and Kahneman (1983) regard as normative for examples such as the well-known Linda problem:

Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Please rank the following statements by their probability, using 1 for the most probable and 8 for the least probable.

a. Linda is a teacher in an elementary school

b. Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes

c. Linda is active in the feminist movement

d. Linda is a psychiatric social worker

e. Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters

f. Linda is a bank teller

g. Linda is an insurance salesperson

h. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement