Trained to Be Dull
The concept that bankers and financial institutions appear conservative through their dress and demeanor, but their lending activities are often highly risky and prone to catastrophic losses (Black Swans) that erase past earnings.
THE IDEA
Trained to Be Dull
Think of a bank chairman whose institution makes steady profits over a long time, only to lose everything in a single reversal of fortune. Traditionally, bankers of the lending variety have been pear-shaped, clean-shaven, and dress in possibly the most comforting and boring manner, in dark suits, white shirts, and red ties. Indeed, for their lending business, banks hire dull people and train them to be even more dull. But this is for show. If they look conservative, it is because their loans only go bust on rare, very rare, occasions. There is no way to gauge the effectiveness of their lending activity by observing it over a day, a week, a month, or … even a century! In the summer of 1982, large American banks lost close to all their past earnings (cumulatively), about everything they ever made in the history of American banking—everything. They had been lending to South and Central American countries that all defaulted at the same time—“an event of an exceptional nature.” So it took just one summer to figure out that this was a sucker’s business and that all their earnings came from a very risky game. All that while the bankers led everyone, especially themselves, into believing that they were “conservative.” They are not conservative; just phenomenally skilled at self-deception by burying the possibility of a large, devastating loss under the rug. In fact, the travesty repeated itself a decade later, with the “risk-conscious” large banks once again under financial strain, many of them near-bankrupt, after the real-estate collapse of the early 1990s in which the now defunct savings and loan industry required a taxpayer-funded bailout of more than half a trillion dollars. The Federal Reserve bank protected them at our expense: when “conservative” bankers make profits, they get the benefits; when they are hurt, we pay the costs.
After graduating from Wharton, I initially went to work for Bankers Trust (now defunct). There, the chairman’s office, rapidly forgetting about the story of 1982, broadcast the results of every quarter with an announcement explaining how smart, profitable, conservative (and good looking) they were. It was obvious that their profits were simply cash borrowed from destiny with some random payback time. I have no problem with risk taking, just please, please, do not call yourself conservative and act superior to other businesses who are not as vulnerable to Black Swans.
Another example is the almost-instant bankruptcy, in 1998, of a financial investment company (hedge fund) called Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), which used the methods and risk expertise of two “Nobel economists,” who were called “geniuses” but were in fact using phony, bell curve–style mathematics while managing to convince themselves that it was great science and thus turning the entire financial establishment into suckers. One of the largest trading losses ever in history took place in almost the blink of an eye, with no warning signal (more, much more on that in Chapter 17).*
When to use it
Evaluating the risk profile of a bank or financial institution before investing.
Analyzing a company's reported earnings to see if they are sustainable or borrowed from future risk-taking.
Assessing the true conservatism of any organization that claims to be risk-averse but operates in a domain with rare, severe events.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
1982 Latin American Debt Crisis
Large American banks lost nearly all their cumulative earnings in one summer when South and Central American countries defaulted simultaneously, revealing that their lending business was a risky gamble disguised as conservative banking.
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) Collapse (1998)
Taleb describes LTCM as a hedge fund whose apparent sophistication masked exposure to extreme losses. Its collapse illustrates his warning that a reassuring model and a record of profits can conceal the possibility of a catastrophic loss.
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
In what ways might you be misleading yourself about the riskiness of a seemingly stable system?
How can you differentiate between genuine conservatism and a facade that hides hidden risks?
What hidden assumptions in your own financial or business models could lead to a sudden catastrophic loss?
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- The Black Swan The Impact of the Highly Improbable With a new section On Robustness and Fragility (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)