The Silver Medal Effect: When Better Off Feels Worse

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The purpose of this research was to examine whether there are reliable situations in which those who are objectively better off nonetheless feel worse than those in an inferior position. Athletics offered an ideal context in which to test this question for the same reason that it offers a useful context for investigating many psychological hypotheses – the availability of data of unusual objectivity and precision (Baumeister & Steinhilber, 1984; Frank & Gilovich, 1988; Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985; Lau & Russell, 1980). In addition, athletics was chosen as the domain of investigation in this case because performance in athletics often yields a clearly defined rank order. Someone enters the record books as the first-, second-, or third-place finisher.

It should be clear, however, that the significance of the present results extends far beyond the playing field or the medal stand. There are many other situations in which the same processes documented here can likewise cause those who are better off to feel worse. A student who misses out on an A− by one point and earns a B+ could easily feel less satisfied with the grade than someone who is in the middle of the pack of Bs. Or consider a person who correctly guesses all but one number in a lottery. Such an individual misses out on the jackpot, but usually wins a modest sum for coming close. The prize no doubt provides some enjoyment, but the knowledge of having just missed the jackpot is bound to come up from time to time and ruin otherwise blissful moments. More generally, as our opening quote from William James suggests, being one of the best may not be as satisfying as it might seem. The existence of a rival 'best' can turn a gratifying appreciation of what one is into a disquieting focus on what one is not. . . .

Our results extend previous findings in this area by emphasizing the 'automatic' or 'imposed' nature of many counterfactual thoughts. Much of the recent work on counterfactual thinking has emphasized a person’s ability to choose the most strategic counterfactual comparisons (Markman et al., 1993; Roese, 1994). 'Counterfactual generation has functional value, and people tend to generate those counterfactuals that hold the greatest psychological value for them in a given situation' (Markman et al., 1993, p. 103). Downward comparisons (i.e., thinking about a worse outcome) are thought to provide comfort, whereas upward comparisons (i.e., thinking about a better outcome) are thought to improve future performance. Indeed, it has been shown that people who expect to perform again in the future are more likely to generate upward counterfactuals than those who expect to move on (Markman et al., 1993).

Although many counterfactual thoughts are doubtless strategically chosen in this way, such motivational considerations cannot account for the present findings. On the whole, the silver and bronze medalists at the Barcelona Olympics were at the peak of their athletic careers and therefore likely to continue to engage in similar high-level competitions in the future. From a motivational perspective, then, both groups should have made upward counterfactual comparisons in order to prepare for future contests. The asymmetry in counterfactual comparisons that we observed implies that many counterfactuals are imposed by the nature of the events experienced.

Indeed, Kahneman (1995) outlined a continuum of counterfactual thinking that ranges from 'automatic' to 'elaborative.' Elaborative counterfactual processing is partly brought on through the exercise of choice, and its direction and intensity is influenced by the individual’s motives and intentions. Automatic counterfactual thinking, in contrast, is 'explainable largely in cognitive terms' (Kahneman, 1995, p. 376). The counterfactual thoughts that distinguish silver and bronze medalists shade toward the latter end of this continuum. Coming close to winning the gold, for example, appears to automatically activate frustrating images of having almost won it all.

We are not suggesting, of course, that finishing second or coming close to a cherished outcome always leads to less satisfaction than a slightly more modest performance. Finishing second is truly a mixed blessing. Performing that well provides a number of direct benefits that increase our well being – recognition from others, boosts to self-esteem, and so on. At the same time, it can indirectly lower satisfaction by the unfortunate contrast with what might have been. Thus, the inconsistent effect of finishing second is analogous to the 'endowment' and 'contrast' polarity that Tversky and Griffin (1991) claimed affects the hedonic significance of all experienced events. According to their analysis, any experience has a direct effect on well-being by what it brings to one’s endowment – that is, the pleasure or pain derived from the event itself. But a person’s experiences also have an indirect effect on well being by altering the adaptation level against which future experiences are contrasted. Their contrast (in which the event itself establishes a new standard against which future events are compared) is different than the one at work here (in which the events’ proximity to a better outcome causes one to lose sight of what is and focus on what might have been). The core idea is the same, however. In both cases, the direct effect of the event itself is offset by a comparison process with the opposite effect, be it a comparison of future outcomes to the present, or the present outcome to a counterfactual alternative that was almost attained. . . .

An unresolved issue concerns the duration of the effects we have documented here. We have established that bronze medalists are happier than silver medalists in the short run, but does this effect hold up over time? As yet there are no data to answer this question. Nevertheless, one of the most noteworthy features of life’s near misses seems to be their durability. Consider the account of finishing second that Nicholson Baker (1991) provides his wife:

[I] told her my terrible story of coming in second in the spelling bee in second grade by spelling keep 'c-e-e-p' after successfully tossing off microphone, and how for two or three years afterward I was pained every time a yellow garbage truck drove by on Highland Avenue and I saw the capitals printed on it, 'Help Keep Our City Clean,' with that impossible irrational 'K' that had made me lose so humiliatingly. (p. 70)

Or consider the case of Abel Kiviat, the 1,500-m silver medalist in the 1912 Olympics in Stockholm. Kiviat had the race won until Britain’s Arnold Jackson 'came from nowhere' to beat him by one-tenth of a second. 'I wake up sometimes and say, ‘What the heck happened to me? It’s like a nightmare.” Kiviat was 91 years old when he said this in an interview with the Los Angeles Times (cited in Tait & Silver, 1989, p. 351). It appears that thoughts about 'What might have been' may plague us for a very long time.

* This is an edited and condensed version of a paper that first appeared in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 603–610. Copyright © 1995 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission.