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Mental Models

The Great Asymmetry

When the odds of a rare event are hard to estimate, Taleb argues for examining its consequences: limit losses you cannot afford and seek opportunities with a small, bounded downside and a large possible upside. The payoff structure can guide a decision even when a precise probability is unavailable.

THE IDEA

The Great Asymmetry

All these recommendations have one point in common: asymmetry. Put yourself in situations where favorable consequences are much larger than unfavorable ones.

Indeed, the notion of asymmetric outcomes is the central idea of this book: I will never get to know the unknown since, by definition, it is unknown. However, I can always guess how it might affect me, and I should base my decisions around that.

This idea is often erroneously called Pascal’s wager, after the philosopher and (thinking) mathematician Blaise Pascal. He presented it something like this: I do not know whether God exists, but I know that I have nothing to gain from being an atheist if he does not exist, whereas I have plenty to lose if he does. Hence, this justifies my belief in God.

Pascal’s argument is severely flawed theologically: one has to be naïve enough to believe that God would not penalize us for false belief. Unless, of course, one is taking the quite restrictive view of a naïve God. (Bertrand Russell was reported to have claimed that God would need to have created fools for Pascal’s argument to work.)

But the idea behind Pascal’s wager has fundamental applications outside of theology. It stands the entire notion of knowledge on its head. It eliminates the need for us to understand the probabilities of a rare event (there are fundamental limits to our knowledge of these); rather, we can focus on the payoff and benefits of an event if it takes place. The probabilities of very rare events are not computable; the effect of an event on us is considerably easier to ascertain (the rarer the event, the fuzzier the odds). We can have a clear idea of the consequences of an event, even if we do not know how likely it is to occur. I don’t know the odds of an earthquake, but I can imagine how San Francisco might be affected by one. This idea that in order to make a decision you need to focus on the consequences (which you can know) rather than the probability (which you can’t know) is the central idea of uncertainty. Much of my life is based on it.

You can build an overall theory of decision making on this idea. All you have to do is mitigate the consequences. As I said, if my portfolio is exposed to a market crash, the odds of which I can’t compute, all I have to do is buy insurance, or get out and invest the amounts I am not willing to ever lose in less risky securities.

Effectively, if free markets have been successful, it is precisely because they allow the trial-and-error process I call “stochastic tinkering” on the part of competing individual operators who fall for the narrative fallacy—but are effectively collectively partaking of a grand project. We are increasingly learning to practice stochastic tinkering without knowing it—thanks to overconfident entrepreneurs, naïve investors, greedy investment bankers, and aggressive venture capitalists brought together by the free-market system. This gives me reason to expect useful knowledge to emerge through decentralized experimentation as well as academic work.

In the end we are being driven by history, all the while thinking that we are doing the driving.

I’ll sum up this long section on prediction by stating that we can easily narrow down the reasons we can’t figure out what’s going on. There are: a) epistemic arrogance and our corresponding future blindness; b) the Platonic notion of categories, or how people are fooled by reductions, particularly if they have an academic degree in an expert-free discipline; and, finally c) flawed tools of inference, particularly the Black Swan–free tools from Mediocristan.

The limits of inference are part of this “plumbing,” especially when tools designed for Mediocristan are applied to Extremistan.

* This chapter provides a general conclusion for those who by now say, “Taleb, I get the point, but what should I do?” My answer is that if you got the point, you are pretty much there. But here is a nudge.

* Dan Gilbert showed in a famous paper, “How Mental Systems Believe,” that we are not natural skeptics and that not believing required an expenditure of mental effort.

* Make sure that you have plenty of these small bets; avoid being blinded by the vividness of one single Black Swan. Have as many of these small bets as you can conceivably have. Even venture capital firms fall for the narrative fallacy with a few stories that “make sense” to them; they do not have as many bets as they should. If venture capital firms are profitable, it is not because of the stories they have in their heads, but because they are exposed to unplanned rare events.

* There is a finer epistemological point. Remember that in a virtuous Black Swan business, what the past did not reveal is almost certainly going to be good for you. When you look at past biotech revenues, you do not see the superblockbuster in them, and owing to the potential for a cure for cancer (or headaches, or baldness, or bad sense of humor, etc.), there is a small probability that the sales in that industry may turn out to be monstrous, far larger than might be expected. On the other hand, consider negative Black Swan businesses. The track record you see is likely to overestimate the properties. Recall the 1982 blowup of banks: they appeared to the naïve observer to be more profitable than they seemed. Insurance companies are of two kinds: the regular diversifiable kind that belongs to Mediocristan (say, life insurance) and the more critical and explosive Black Swan–prone risks that are usually sold to reinsurers. According to the data, reinsurers have lost money on underwriting over the past couple of decades, but, unlike bankers, they are introspective enough to know that it actually could have been far worse, because the past twenty years did not have a big catastrophe, and all you need is one of those per century to kiss the business good-bye. Many finance academics doing “valuation” on insurance seem to have missed the point.

Further Reading

The book discusses inequality, Gaussian assumptions, and fractal randomness in Chapters 15, 17, and the second half of Chapter 16. Its practical discussion continues in Part 4.

When to use it

  • Protecting a portfolio against market crashes by buying put options or shifting to safer assets.

  • Evaluating a venture capital fund: examine how a few possible successes could affect the portfolio, what can be lost, and how much depends on a single investment.

  • Funding medical research that could lead to a blockbuster drug with huge upside.

  • Reviewing catastrophe exposure in insurance: check whether diversification or reinsurance limits losses, including whether the same event could affect many policies or the reinsurer.

FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE

In practice

01

Pascal's Wager

Blaise Pascal argued that one should believe in God because the consequences of being wrong as an atheist (eternal damnation) far outweigh the consequences of being wrong as a believer (limited loss). Taleb notes this is flawed theologically but illustrates the principle of focusing on consequences over probability.

02

Earthquake Preparedness

Even if the probability of an earthquake in San Francisco is unknown, one can imagine the consequences and take mitigating actions.

03

Portfolio Insurance

In Taleb’s example, insurance or a shift to less risky securities can reduce a portfolio’s exposure to a crash whose odds are uncertain. The protection still has costs and limits.

04

Venture Capital

Taleb argues that a venture capital portfolio can benefit from unexpected successes among many small bets. That exposure offers a possible large upside; it does not guarantee a profitable fund.

05

Biotech Investment

A biotech company’s past revenues may omit the possibility of a highly successful future drug. Taleb uses this as an example of upside that a historical track record can miss, alongside the possibility that the research produces no such drug.

06

Reinsurance

Taleb describes reinsurers as exposed to rare catastrophic losses and reports underwriting losses during the period he discusses. His point is that a quiet historical period can still understate the scale of a future loss.

✳

A MOMENT TO REFLECT

Put it to work.

  1. Think of a decision where you spent most of your effort estimating the odds. What would examining the scale and limits of the consequences add?

  2. Think of a situation where you have limited control over a rare event. What steps can you take to limit downside or improve upside regardless of probability?

  3. How can you apply the principle of stochastic tinkering—making many small bets with asymmetric outcomes—to your career or investments?

Connected ideas

Another lens can bring the same problem into focus.

Often confused with

References

  1. How Mental Systems Believe — Dan Gilbert

CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION

Source texts

  • The Black Swan The Impact of the Highly Improbable With a new section On Robustness and Fragility (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)
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