Subjective Probability and the Preasymptotic Nature of Reality
Taleb treats probability as a measure of belief constrained by consistency. He argues that practical decisions must account for limited knowledge and what can happen before any long-run result is reached, rather than relying on an asymptotic description alone.
THE IDEA
PROBABILITY HAS TO BE SUBJECTIVE †
A Black Swan corresponds mainly to an incomplete map of the world. Jochen Runde stressed this subjective aspect in an essay on the idea, raising a question about probability itself: can rational people with different knowledge assign different probabilities to the same future event? The account that allows them to do so is called “subjective probability.”
Subjective probability was formulated by Frank Plumpton Ramsey in 1925 and Bruno de Finetti in 1937. The take on probability by these two intellectual giants is that it can be represented as a quantification of the degree of belief (you set a number between 0 and 1 that corresponds to the strength of your belief in the occurrence of a given event), subjective to the observer, who expresses it as rationally as he wishes under some constraints. These constraints of consistency in decision making are obvious: you cannot bet there is a 60 percent chance of snow tomorrow and a 50 percent chance that there will be no snow. The agent needs to avoid violating something called the Dutch book constraint: that is, you cannot express your probabilities inconsistently by engaging in a series of bets that lock in a certain loss, for example, by acting as if the probabilities of mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes can add up to more than 100 percent.
There is another difference here, between “true” randomness (say the equivalent of God throwing a die) and randomness that results from what I call epistemic limitations, that is, lack of knowledge. What is called ontological (or ontic) uncertainty, as opposed to epistemic, is the type of randomness where the future is not implied by the past (or not even implied by anything). It is created every minute by the complexity of our actions, which makes the uncertainty much more fundamental than the epistemic one coming from imperfections in knowledge.
It means that there is no such thing as a long run for such systems, called “nonergodic” systems—as opposed to the “ergodic” ones. In an ergodic system, the probabilities of what may happen in the long run are not impacted by events that may take place, say, next year. Someone playing roulette in the casino can become very rich, but, if he keeps playing, given that the house has an advantage, he will eventually go bust. Someone rather unskilled will eventually fail. So ergodic systems are invariant, on average, to paths, taken in the intermediate term—what researchers call absence of path dependency. A nonergodic system has no real long-term properties—it is prone to path dependency.
I believe that the distinction between epistemic and ontic uncertainty is important philosophically, but entirely irrelevant in the real world. Epistemic uncertainty is so hard to disentangle from the more fundamental one. This is the case of a “distinction without a difference” that can mislead because it distracts from the real problems: practitioners make a big deal out of it instead of focusing on epistemic constraints. Recall that skepticism is costly, and should be available when needed.
There is no such thing as a “long run” in practice; what matters is what happens before the long run. The problem of using the notion of “long run,” or what mathematicians call the asymptotic property (what happens when you extend something to infinity), is that it usually makes us blind to what happens before the long run, known as preasymptotics. Different functions have different preasymptotics, according to speed of convergence to that asymptote. But, unfortunately, as I keep repeating to students, life takes place in the preasymptote, not in some Platonic long run, and some properties that hold in the preasymptote (or the short run) can be markedly divergent from those that take place in the long run. So theory, even if it works, meets a short-term reality that has more texture. Few understand that there is generally no such thing as a reachable long run except as a mathematical construct to solve equations; to assume a long run in a complex system, you need to also assume that nothing new will emerge. In addition, you may have a perfect model of the world, stripped of any uncertainty concerning the analytics of the representation, but have a small imprecision in one of the parameters to input in it. Recall Lorenz’s butterfly effect of Chapter 11. Such minutely small uncertainty, at the level of the slightest parameter, might, because of nonlinearities, percolate to a huge uncertainty at the level of the output of the model. Climate models, for instance, suffer from such nonlinearities, and even if we had the right model (which we, of course, don’t), a small change in one of the parameters, called calibration, can entirely reverse the conclusions.
I believe that many of these mathematical and philosophical distinctions are entirely overblown, Soviet-Harvard-style, top-down, as people start with a model and then impose it on reality and start categorizing, rather than start with reality and look at what fits it, in a bottom-up way.
When to use it
Investment strategy: Acknowledging that probability is subjective helps investors avoid overconfidence in models, especially when dealing with tail risks and nonlinearities.
Policy making: Record expert disagreements, assumptions, and model limitations when using probability estimates for planning.
Everyday risk assessment: Compare your personal probability assessment with relevant aggregate data and ask what evidence explains any difference.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
Weather Forecasting Disagreement
Two rational meteorologists look at the same data and assign different probabilities to the chance of snow tomorrow: one says 60%, the other 30%. Both can be consistent with their models and beliefs; subjective probability allows for this variation as long as each obeys coherence constraints (no Dutch book).
Market Risk and Tail Events
A risk manager assigns a 0.01% probability to a market crash from historical data, while another assigns 5% after considering rare events and model limitations. The difference calls for examining their evidence and assumptions. Neither internal consistency nor the larger estimate alone establishes which assessment is better.
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
In what daily decisions do you implicitly assign probabilities to outcomes? How might your subjective probability differ from someone else's, even if both are rational?
Can you think of a situation where focusing on the 'long run' (asymptotic behavior) might mislead you about the risks you face in the short term?
Why does Taleb argue that the distinction between epistemic and ontic uncertainty is a 'distinction without a difference' in practice? Do you agree?
Often confused with
References
- Frank Plumpton Ramsey's formulation of subjective probability — Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1925)
- Bruno de Finetti's probability theory — Bruno de Finetti (1937)
- Jochen Runde's essay on Black Swan — Jochen Runde
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- The Black Swan The Impact of the Highly Improbable With a new section On Robustness and Fragility (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)