Probability, the Child of Skepticism

Probability, the Child of Skepticism

Until the Mediterranean basin was dominated by monotheism, which led to the belief in some form of uniqueness of the truth (to be superseded later by episodes of communism), skepticism had gained currency among many major thinkers—and certainly permeated the world. The Romans did not have a religion per se; they were too tolerant to accept a given truth. Theirs was a collection of a variety of flexible and syncretic superstitions. I will not get too theological, except to say that we had to wait for a dozen centuries in the Western world to espouse critical thinking again. Indeed, for some strange reason during the Middle Ages, Arabs were critical thinkers (through their postclassical philosophical tradition) when Christian thought was dogmatic; then, after the Renaissance, the roles mysteriously reversed.

One author from antiquity who provides us evidence of such thinking is the garrulous Cicero. He preferred to be guided by probability than allege with certainty—very handy, some said, because it allowed him to contradict himself. This may be a reason for us, who have learned from Popper how to remain self-critical, to respect him more, as he did not hew stubbornly to an opinion for the mere fact that he had voiced it in the past. Indeed your average literature professor would fault him for his contradictions and his change of mind.

It was not until modern times that such desire to be free from our own past statements emerged. Nowhere was it made more eloquently than in rioting student graffiti in Paris. The student movement that took place in France in 1968, with the youth no doubt choking under the weight of years of having to sound intelligent and coherent, produced a demand that the excerpt introduces but does not quote. Its wording is missing.