Moralistic Fallacy

90 Moralistic Fallacy

Galen Foresman

Since we all know that it’s wrong, it obviously is wrong.

John Doe

The moralistic fallacy (also called the moral fallacy) occurs when one concludes that something is a particular way because it should or ought to be that way. Alternatively, this fallacy occurs when one concludes that something cannot be a particular way because it should not or ought not be that way. It is the assumption that what ought to be is what is, or that the undesirable or morally wrong must oppose nature or reality. It represents the reverse of the naturalistic fallacy (or is/ought fallacy), where one fallaciously infers that what is natural or real is therefore moral; the moralistic fallacy instead assumes that moral imperatives determine what is real or will happen.

Formally:

1. X is the way things should/ought to be.
2. Therefore, X is the way things are or are going to be.

Or

1. X is not the way things should/ought to be.
2. Therefore, X is not the way things are or are going to be.

The systematic error in reasoning occurs in assuming a relationship between normative or evaluative claims and reality, such that what is true of the world entirely explains what is good or ought to be, morally speaking (naturalistic fallacy), or, alternatively, what is right, wrong, good, or bad in moral terms entirely explains the way the actual world is and will be (moralistic fallacy). While there are relationships between reality and morality, it is fallacious to deduce one simply based on knowledge of the other. One can construct an argument that an ought aligns with an is, but the connection cannot merely be assumed.

Variations of the moralistic fallacy occur whenever any normative claim is used to justify a factual claim about the world, and so the pattern of fallacious reason central to the moralistic fallacy can also be found in legal reasoning, prudential reasoning, or reasoning regarding proper etiquette, aesthetics, humor, or appropriate emotional responses. For example, in their paper “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions,” Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson (2000) argue, “to commit the moralistic fallacy is to infer, from the claim that it would be wrong or vicious to feel an emotion, that it is therefore unfitting,” because, as they contend, emotions may be fitting in particular situations, even if it is morally wrong or inexpedient to feel them. A racy or distasteful joke may still be funny even if it is morally wrong to find it humorous. And so, to claim that racy or distasteful jokes can never be funny because they are immoral is to commit the moralistic fallacy.

More commonly, the moralistic fallacy appears in everyday thinking when one assumes that what is right is what will be. If a teacher assumes students won’t cheat because it is wrong for them to do so, that teacher commits the moralistic fallacy. Similarly, the moralistic fallacy is committed when one assumes citizens will vote because they have a moral duty to do so. The fallacy also extends to assumptions about human nature: simply because a behavior like adultery or aggression is morally wrong does not mean people will not experience biological urges or desires toward it. What we ought not do according to moral norms is not necessarily disconnected from what we are naturally inclined to do.

Fortunately, the flawed reasoning found in these examples is easily avoided. While norms of morality, prudence, or the law do not entirely determine the way things are or will be, they do often give us reasonable expectations for how things are or will be. It would not, for example, commit the moralistic fallacy to assume an honest person is unlikely to lie to you. And when a person promises to meet you for coffee, it isn’t fallacious to conclude that he will probably meet you for coffee. In both of these examples, avoiding the fallacy is a simple matter of relaxing the absolute claim that something is or will be the case to a moderate and qualified claim that something is likely to be the case.

Many young drivers are taught to avoid a form of the moralistic fallacy when they learn to drive defensively. When driving, it is easy to jump to the conclusion that other drivers will behave in ways that conform to standard legal norms of the road. Cars next to you on the highway should stay in their respective lanes and should check their blind spots before changing lanes, but all too often this is not the case. And so, learning to drive defensively is largely about assuming that other automobiles on the road will not always act in ways that conform to the norms of good driving.