Moods and Processing Strategies

MOODS AND PROCESSING STRATEGIES

In addition to influencing memory and judgment, individuals’ moods have also been found to influence performance on a wide variety of cognitive tasks (for reviews and different theoretical perspectives, see Bless, 2001; Forgas, 1995; Isen, 1987; Schwarz & Clore, 1996; and the contributions in Martin & Clore, 2001). Although the findings bearing on well-defined formal reasoning tasks (such as syllogistic reasoning, puzzles, or anagrams) are complex and inconsistent (see Clore et al., 1994), the findings bearing on less-structured social reasoning tasks (most notably, impression formation, stereotyping, and persuasion) show a more coherent pattern. In general, individuals in a sad mood are more likely to use a systematic, data-driven strategy of information processing, with considerable attention to detail. In contrast, individuals in a happy mood are more likely to rely on preexisting general knowledge structures, using a top-down, heuristic strategy of information processing, with less attention to detail.

These differences can again be traced to the informative functions of affective states (Bless, 1997; Schwarz, 1990, 2001). We usually feel bad when we encounter a threat of negative or a lack of positive outcomes, and feel good when we obtain positive outcomes and are not threatened by negative ones. As a result, our moods reflect the state of our environment and being in a bad mood signals a problematic situation, whereas being in a good mood signals a benign situation. A growing body of research suggests that individuals’ thought processes are tuned to meet the situational requirements signalled by their feelings. When negative feelings signal a problematic situation, the individual is likely to attend to the details at hand, investing the effort necessary for a careful analysis. In contrast, when positive feelings signal a benign situation, the individual may see little need to engage in cognitive effort, unless this is required by other current goals. Therefore, the individual may rely on preexisting knowledge structures that worked well in the past, and may prefer simple heuristics over more effortful, detail-oriented judgmental strategies.

Numerous studies are compatible with this general perspective, as illustrated later. Importantly, mood effects on processing style are eliminated when the informational value of the mood is undermined (Sinclair, Mark, & Clore 1994), paralleling the findings in the judgment domain discussed previously. This finding supports the informative functions logic and is difficult to reconcile with competing approaches that trace mood effects on processing style to differential influences of happy and sad moods on individuals’ cognitive capacity (e.g., Mackie & Worth, 1989; for a review, see Schwarz & Clore, 1996) or to differential brain dopamine levels (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999). Both approaches would predict main effects of mood, rather than effects that are contingent on the mood’s perceived informational value.