Insensitivity to Features that Affect Enjoyment/Aversiveness
This cognitive bias describes how affective responses (liking/aversion) are often insensitive to objective features like probability or scope, leading to decisions that diverge from rational expected value, as demonstrated by experiments on electric shock avoidance and cold water pain.
THE IDEA
Insensitivity to Features that Affect Enjoyment/Aversiveness
Hedonic efficiency is served when the intensity of our desires and aversions corresponds closely with the intensity of our pleasures and pains. The link is strong most of the time (e.g., people take greater steps to avoid a bee’s stinger than a mosquito’s proboscis). However, affect is not an infallible guide, and may be insensitive to certain features of an outcome that matter. For example, the fear generated by the prospect of an electric shock is insensitive to its probability of occurrence (see, e.g., Bankhart & Elliott, 1974; Elliott, 1975; Monat, Averill, & Lazarus, 1972; Snortum & Wilding, 1971). Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001) argue that this may explain why judgments and choices are often insensitive to variations in probability except for those involving a transition from impossibility to possibility or from likelihood to certainty.
Consistent with such an account, Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) found that people would pay nearly as much to avoid a 1% chance of an electric shock as they would pay to avoid a 99% chance of it ($7 and $10, respectively). Similarly, Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade (2000) argue that the dramatic scope insensitivity displayed in contingent valuation studies (see Frederick & Fischhoff, 1998, for a review) occurs because willingness to pay is an expression of affective response and affective response is insensitive to quantitative detail (e.g. whether the proposed intervention saves 2,000 birds or 200,000).
The link between liking and enjoyment may also be weakened or broken when decisions are made by consulting one’s memories, because important aspects of an experience, such as its duration, may be lost in its transcription to memory (see Kahneman, 2000 for a discussion). A simple and memorable experiment reported in Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, and Redelmeier (1993) illustrates this. In that study, subjects were sequentially (the order was randomized) exposed to two mildly painful experiences: a “short” episode, in which they immersed one hand in cold water (57° F) for 60 seconds; and a “long” episode, in which they immersed their other hand in cold water for 90 seconds: 60 seconds in 57° water plus an additional 30 seconds during which the water was warmed to 59 degrees (which made the water less uncomfortable, but not pleasant). When the participants were later asked which of the two experiences they preferred to repeat, most chose the “long” trial. For someone who wants to minimize pain, this choice is obviously not correct, because the 30 seconds of diminishing pain is still additional pain. However, although these choices are wrong, they are not crazy or silly. As Kahneman and colleagues note, choosing by liking is certainly a sensible strategy – what could be more reasonable than preferring the experience that is remembered as being better?
When to use it
When evaluating insurance policies: People may overvalue insurance against low-probability, high-emotion risks (e.g., plane crash) while undervaluing more probable but less emotionally charged risks (e.g., car accident).
When assessing a donation appeal, compare its emotional impact with evidence about how many people it helps and how effectively it uses funds.
When discussing a painful procedure, distinguish expected intensity and duration from how a previous experience is remembered.
In user experience design, evaluate memorable moments and the ending alongside the quality and duration of the entire experience.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
Willingness to pay to avoid electric shock
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) found that participants were willing to pay nearly as much to avoid a 1% chance of an electric shock ($7) as to avoid a 99% chance ($10), demonstrating insensitivity to probability when strong affect is involved.
Cold water hand immersion experiment
Kahneman et al. (1993) had subjects immerse one hand in cold water (57°F) for 60 seconds (short trial) and the other for 90 seconds (long trial: 60 seconds at 57°F plus 30 seconds at 59°F, still uncomfortable but less so). Most subjects preferred to repeat the long trial, even though it involved more total pain, because the memory of the experience was influenced more by the improvement at the end than by the total duration.
Scope insensitivity in contingent valuation
Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade (2000) noted that people's willingness to pay for environmental interventions is often insensitive to the magnitude of the outcome, e.g., saving 2,000 birds vs. 200,000 birds, because affective response does not scale linearly with quantity.
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
Think of a personal decision where your emotional reaction to a risk (e.g., flying, vaccination) seemed disproportionate to the actual probability. How might this bias have influenced your choice?
When recalling a past experience (a vacation, a medical procedure), do you find that the peak intensity and the ending influence your memory more than the overall duration? How could this lead to suboptimal future decisions?
Consider a charitable donation you made or considered. Did the number of beneficiaries affect how much you were willing to give, or was your response driven more by an emotional reaction to the cause? How might this bias affect your giving?
Often confused with
References
- — Bankhart, C. & Elliott, R. (1974)
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)