Heuristics and Biases in Application
Applying heuristics-and-biases research tests both a theory and the assumptions used to connect it to a real situation. A stable framework helps assess when laboratory findings explain, predict, or improve judgments outside the lab.
THE IDEA
41. Heuristics and Biases in Application
Baruch Fischhoff
Heuristics and biases are in the public domain. They appear in texts, courses, books, and applications of many kinds. These endorsements speak to the persuasiveness of the basic research, the severity of the applied problems, and the face validity of debiasing as a possible solution. However, as the research itself shows, popularity alone proves little. Erroneous beliefs can be firmly and widely held even in applied fields with high stakes (Bunker, Barnes, & Mosteller, 1977; Byrne, 1986, Gilovich, 1991). One cannot expect practitioners to read the research literature. Moreover even peer-reviewed journals can be penetrated by vigorous advocates of flawed work. Nor can one expect them to extract simple lessons from individual applications. Coincidental events are always at play, in explanation, prediction, or prescription. Both radical skeptics and rabid enthusiasts can find ad hoc reasons for creating the picture that they seek regarding the applicability of research.
Achieving cumulative wisdom regarding the generalizability of heuristics-and-biases research requires interpreting the available evidence within a stable, comprehensive framework – one that identifies a set of potentially relevant contextual factors and provides bridging theories for characterizing actual situations in its terms. When those situations are in the lab, such a framework might reveal otherwise neglected complexity (when investigators manipulate one feature, without considering concurrent changes in others or the restricted circumstances in which their focal change is possible). With real-world situations, an interpretative framework might reduce otherwise bewildering complexity, by focusing attention on features whose influence (if any) will emerge over time. This chapter offers such a framework. It provides the subtext for reviewing applications of the heuristics-and-biases paradigm in many domains. These applications focus primarily on health, safety, and environmental decisions – arenas in which many choices rest on judgments of novel, uncertain events.
Having something to say in diverse cases demonstrates the range of the heuristics-and-biases perspective – and its ability to be tested in them. Its validity is affirmed by observing similar phenomena under comparable circumstances in the lab and the world. Each such application tests the validity of the theories emerging from the lab. It shows how clearly the research literature provides guidance on how heuristics are used and on what biases (if any) result.
Inevitably, each extension requires auxiliary hypotheses, mapping the abstract terms of the theory to the concrete complexities of the real world. Each application simultaneously tests both the theory and the auxiliary hypotheses. A framework allows for orderly, rather than ad hoc, tests of those hypotheses. This chapter critically examines the application of heuristics-and-biases research from these dual perspectives, asking what theory and practice can learn from each other. It focuses, in turn, on applications to (1) explaining past judgments, (2) predicting future judgments, and (3) improving future judgments.
When to use it
Public health campaigns can use insights from the availability heuristic to design more effective risk communication messages that counter overestimation of rare events.
Environmental impact assessments should consider anchoring bias when presenting baseline data to stakeholders, as initial numbers can skew perceptions.
In safety management, understanding overconfidence bias can improve hazard identification and risk assessment processes.
Policy makers can use debiasing techniques informed by heuristics research to improve decision making under uncertainty, such as in emergency response planning.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
Overestimation of Rare Risks in Environmental Policy
After vivid coverage of an oil spill, a policymaker may give it more attention than a larger chronic risk such as air pollution. To test whether availability is distorting the decision, compare the risks, expected benefits, and reasons for the proposed spending.
Optimism Bias in Personal Health Decisions
Individuals may underestimate their personal risk of developing a disease due to optimism bias, leading to lower adherence to preventive measures like screenings or vaccinations, which public health campaigns must address.
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
How can practitioners in high-stakes fields critically evaluate the validity of heuristics-and-biases research before applying it?
What are the potential risks of applying heuristics-and-biases findings without considering the context-specific auxiliary hypotheses?
In what ways can a stable framework help reconcile conflicting results from different applications of heuristics-and-biases research?
References
- Untitled — Bunker, J.P., Barnes, B.A., & Mosteller, F. (1977)
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)