Biased Memory for Events That Almost Did Not Happen

Biased Memory for Events That Almost Did Not Happen

The hypothesis that events that almost did not happen tend to be highly available in memory might help explain a wide variety of common intuitions that have the “feel” of superstitions. As an example, consider the sense – widely shared, if our informal survey is correct – that the act of switching lines in front of busy counters virtually ensures that one’s old line will speed up and one’s new line will slow down. It is possible that a factual basis underlies this belief, but our analysis suggests how this belief could emerge without any empirical basis. First, following Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982b) and Landman’s (1987) accounts, we propose that negative events preceded by acts of commission (e.g., being delayed after switching lines) are more likely to give rise to counterfactual, “if only” self-recriminations than either negative events preceded by acts of omission (e.g., being delayed after contemplating but deciding against switching lines) or positive outcomes preceded by acts of either commission or omission (e.g., being accelerated after either switching or not switching lines). Second, we propose that the greater self-recriminations that follow ill-fated acts of commission make those experiences more available in memory. Finally, we propose that the greater availability in memory of ill-fated acts of commission leads people to overestimate the commonness of these events.

The world of sports provides a rich source of beliefs that appear to derive from the tendency of some events to evoke counterfactual alternatives more strongly, and hence to be more available in memory, than others. Consider the account given by Juan Marichal, a Baseball Hall of Fame pitcher, as to why pitchers “hate” to walk batters intentionally: “It always seems that an intentionally walked batter ends up scoring.” Now it is not obvious, at least to us, why intentionally walked batters would score more often than unintentionally walked batters. The holding of such a belief is understandable, however, if one assumes that the negative consequences of intentional actions (e.g., intentional walks), because they are so easily imagined otherwise, will be more available in memory. Consider another common observation from baseball authorities: The team that gets the most two-out hits generally wins the game. Why might hits that occur with two players out be any more crucial to success than hits that occur with no one out or with one player out? There may be some reason this pattern is so, but even if the belief has no factual basis, our findings suggest why students of baseball might subscribe to it. The key is this: Opponents’ hits that come with two players out evoke frustrating counterfactual thoughts more readily than hits that come with no one or one player out. Because a team’s at-bat ends with its third out, hits that occur with two players out seem closer to not having happened than those that come with no one or one player out (Miller & Gunasegaram, 1990; Miller & McFarland, 1986). Furthermore, two-out hits, by generating more “if only” self-recriminations and hindsight musings, tend to be more available in memory. Thus, the perception that permitting two-out hits is especially costly might rest not on fact, but on distorted memory. It is simply hard for people to forget what almost did not happen.

A similar process might underlie the widely held (and often ponderously repeated) belief of “experts” that third-down conversions play an especially critical role in the game of American football. Why might a team’s success at gaining first downs (10-yard increments) on its (effectively) last try be any more predictive of its ultimate success than its success at gaining first downs on its first or second try? Again, regardless of whether an empirical relationship exists here, our account of the link between event mutability and memory availability indicates how such a belief might emerge. First, because the team in possession of the ball (i.e., offense) generally kicks the ball away if it does not gain a first down by its third try, the defense can be said to have come closer to having stopped an offense when it prevents the offense from gaining 10 yards until the offense’s third down. Second, because events that almost did not happen generate more affect and counterfactual thought, third-down conversions (from the perspective of both the offense and defense) are more available in memory. Winners and losers alike remember those events that almost did not happen and, consequently, accord them undue causal significance in their respective fates. . . .