Availability Heuristic: The Interplay of Declarative and Experiential Information
This chapter examines whether the subjective experience of ease or difficulty of recall influences judgments independently of the content recalled, and reviews research using misattribution manipulations to disentangle these effects.
THE IDEA
THE INTERPLAY OF DECLARATIVE AND EXPERIENTIAL INFORMATION
This chapter addresses the ambiguity of whether the subjective experience of ease or difficulty of recall has an impact on our judgments distinct from the impact of the content that comes to mind. The answer to this ambiguity has important implications for two different programs of research. On the one hand, Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) conceptualization of the availability heuristic emphasized the role of experiential information, specifically the phenomenal experience of ease or difficulty of recall. On the other hand, a large body of research in social cognition demonstrated that judgments are based on the declarative information that is most accessible at the time of judgment (for reviews, see Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1987; Higgins, 1996; Schwarz, 1995; Wyer & Srull, 1989). When asked to form a judgment, people rarely retrieve all information that may bear on the task, but truncate the search process as soon as enough information has come to mind to form a judgment with sufficient subjective certainty. Accordingly, the judgment is based on the information most accessible at the time. More important, the ambiguity noted previously cuts both ways: Much as one may wonder if the apparent impact of experienced ease of recall actually reflects reliance on a biased sample of recalled content, one may also wonder if the apparent impact of the most accessible information actually reflects reliance on the experienced ease with which the initial pieces of information came to mind.
We first review research that explored whether the phenomenal experience of ease or difficulty of recall is informative in its own right. If so, the impact of experienced ease of recall should be attenuated when the informational value of the experience is called into question. Studies that used misattribution manipulations support this hypothesis (e.g., Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz, 1999; Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991; Wänke, Schwarz, & Bless, 1995). Following a discussion of these studies, we address the interplay of declarative and experiential information and review research that introduced conditions under which reliance on experienced ease of recall and reliance on recalled content lead to different judgmental outcomes. This research suggests that individuals rely on ease of recall when the informational value of their subjective experiences is not called into question, but turn to content of recall when the experiential information is deemed uninformative (e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991). Finally, we identify some conditions that influence whether people are more likely to rely on experiential or declarative information in arriving at a judgment when both sources of information are considered informative (e.g., Grayson & Schwarz, 1999; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998; Vaughn, 1997). The chapter concludes with an integrative discussion of the interplay of experiential and declarative information in judgment formation.
When to use it
When assessing the frequency of events (e.g., causes of death), consider whether ease of recall from media coverage is distorting your perception.
In marketing, ads that make product benefits easy to recall may increase perceived likelihood of positive outcomes.
In self-evaluation, encourage listing only a few strengths to avoid the experience of difficulty that might undermine confidence.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
Ease of Recall and Self-Judgments
In a classic study, participants were asked to recall 6 or 12 examples of their own assertive behavior. Those who recalled 6 examples found the task easier and subsequently rated themselves as more assertive than those who recalled 12, despite recalling fewer examples. Their judgments followed the ease of recall (experiential information) rather than the number of examples (declarative content).
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
Recall a time when you judged something as more likely because examples came to mind easily. How might the ease of recall have biased your judgment?
If someone asks you to list 6 versus 12 reasons why a relationship will succeed, how might the difficulty of the latter task affect your optimism?
How can you design a survey or experiment to separate the effects of ease of recall from the content of recall?
Often confused with
References
- Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability — Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1973)
- The social psychology of attitudes — Bodenhausen, G. V., & Wyer, R. S. (1987)
- Activation and application of social stereotypes — Higgins, E. T. (1996)
- Social cognition: Studies of the mental representation and processing of social information — Schwarz, N. (1995)
- Memory and cognition in its social context — Wyer, R. S., & Srull, T. K. (1989)
- The impact of misattribution on the informational value of ease of recall — Haddock, G., Rothman, A. J., Reber, R., & Schwarz, N. (1999)
- Ease of retrieval as information: Another look at the availability heuristic — Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H., & Simons, A. (1991)
- The availability heuristic revisited: Experienced ease of retrieval in mundane frequency estimates — Wänke, M., Schwarz, N., & Bless, H. (1995)
- The interplay of ease of recall and content in judgment — Grayson, C. E., & Schwarz, N. (1999)
- The influence of ease of retrieval on judgments of risk — Rothman, A. J., & Schwarz, N. (1998)
- The role of ease of recall in counterfactual thinking — Vaughn, L. A. (1997)
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)