Availability Heuristic (Ease of Recall)
The availability heuristic posits that people judge the frequency, likelihood, or typicality of events by the ease with which instances come to mind, not just the content recalled. When ease of recall is disentangled from the amount recalled, evidence supports that individuals rely on subjective ease when it is perceived as diagnostic, but switch to recalled content when ease is discounted or personal relevance is high.
THE IDEA
Category: heuristic Secondary: ['cognitive_bias'] Difficulty: advanced Domains: psychology
SUMMARY
In summary, the reviewed research highlights that recall tasks render two distinct sources of information available: the recalled content and the ease or difficulty with which it could be brought to mind. In most situations, these two sources of information are naturally confounded and the experience of ease of recall goes along with a greater amount of recall. This confound rendered many of the classic tests of the availability heuristic nondiagnostic. When this confound is disentangled, however, the available evidence supports the original formulation of the availability heuristic: Individuals estimate the frequency of an event, the likelihood of its occurrence, and its typicality “by the ease with which instances or associations come to mind” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, p. 208). In this chapter, we reviewed several sources of evidence for this conclusion and addressed some of the complications that arise from the dual informativeness of recall tasks.
First, individuals only rely on their recall experiences as a source of information when their informational value is not called into question. When they attribute their experiences to an external influence (e.g., Haddock et al., 1999; Schwarz et al., 1991; Wänke et al., 1995) or are aware that they may not be knowledgeable about the content domain (e.g., Biller et al., 1992; Sanna et al., 2001), the otherwise observed influence of recall experiences is eliminated. This parallels the use of other sources of experiential information, such as moods, emotions, or bodily states (see Schwarz, Chapter 29, this volume; Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Strack, 1992, for reviews).
Second, when subjective recall experiences are considered nondiagnostic, individuals turn to the content of recall as an alternate source of information (e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991). Under unconstrained conditions, reliance on recalled content is likely to lead to the same outcome as reliance on ease of recall, reflecting that recall is experienced as easy when a large number of examples can be brought to mind. When people are induced to recall a few versus many examples, however, these two sources of information have opposite implications: Whereas the experienced ease (or difficulty) suggests that there are many (few) examples, the actual examples recalled lead to the opposite conclusion.
Finally, individuals are likely to rely on ease of recall when the judgment task is of low personal relevance, but draw on recalled content when the task is of high personal relevance (e.g., Grayson & Schwarz, 1999; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). This influence of processing motivation is consistent with dual-process models of judgment (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). However, it could not be observed in previous studies that confounded ease and content of recall.
In addition to bearing on the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and the conditions of its use, the reviewed work bears on research into knowledge accessibility effects in social judgment (see Higgins, 1996, for a review). One of the truisms of social cognition research holds that judgments are based on the information that is most accessible at the time of judgment. Yet the reviewed findings indicate that this is the case only when the respective information is easy to bring to mind. When recall is experienced as difficult, judges arrive at conclusions that contradict the accessible declarative information – inferring, for example, that they are not assertive despite the fact that the recall task rendered 12 examples highly accessible (Schwarz et al., 1991). This suggests that knowledge accessibility effects may often reflect reliance on subjective recall experiences, rather than reliance on the accessible declarative information per se. Complicating things further, which source of information individuals draw on depends on their processing motivation, as seen here (Grayson & Schwarz, 1999; Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). As a result, it is not sufficient to know what is accessible at the time of judgment; instead, we must consider the ease with which the accessible information comes to mind and the processing strategy that judges are likely to apply (Schwarz, 1998). Understanding this interplay of processing motivation, experiential information, and declarative information provides a promising avenue for future research, with potentially important implications for social cognition and decision making.
* Completion of this chapter was supported by a fellowship from the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences to Norbert Schwarz.
When to use it
Evaluating the prevalence of causes of death: Ease of recalling dramatic media reports can lead to overestimating rare but vivid events (e.g., plane crashes) and underestimating common but less salient ones (e.g., heart disease).
In marketing: Asking consumers to list many reasons to buy a product may backfire if they find it difficult, causing them to infer the product is less desirable. Instead, asking for a few reasons can boost purchase intent.
In self-assessment or performance reviews: Recalling few examples of success can lead to higher confidence than recalling many examples, due to the ease of recall. Managers should be aware that this bias may affect how employees rate themselves.
In public health communications: Highlighting the ease of recalling preventive behaviors (e.g., handwashing) can increase perceived importance and intention, whereas emphasizing difficult scenarios may reduce engagement.
FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE
In practice
Ease of recall and self-assessment of assertiveness
In a classic study by Schwarz et al. (1991), participants were asked to recall either 6 (easy) or 12 (difficult) examples of times they acted assertively. Those who recalled 6 examples found it relatively easy and subsequently rated themselves as more assertive, while those who struggled to recall 12 examples rated themselves as less assertive, despite recalling more examples overall. Ease of recall influenced judgments even though the recalled content suggested the opposite.
Personal relevance modulates reliance on ease vs. content
Grayson & Schwarz (1999) found that when participants were asked to recall a few or many examples of either risky or cautious behaviors, their judgments of their own riskiness depended on ease of recall when the task was low in personal relevance, but on the actual content recalled when the task was high in personal relevance. This shows that processing motivation directs which informational source is used.
A MOMENT TO REFLECT
Put it to work.
Think of a time when you found it easy to recall examples of a trait in yourself. Did that ease of recall influence your self-perception? How might your judgment differ if it was difficult to recall examples?
Consider a high-stakes decision you recently made (e.g., choosing a career path). Did you rely more on how easily examples came to mind or on the detailed content of those examples? How does personal relevance affect your use of ease versus content?
When estimating the likelihood of an event (e.g., an accident), reflect on whether you are basing your judgment on vivid, easily recalled instances or on a more balanced set of evidence. How might you correct for the ease-of-recall bias?
Often confused with
References
- Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability — Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1973)
- Ease of recall as information: Another look at the availability heuristic — Schwarz, N., Bless, H., Strack, F., Klumpp, G., Rittenauer-Schatka, H., & Simons, A. (1991)
- The role of processing motivation in the use of ease-of-recall experiences — Grayson, C. E. & Schwarz, N. (1999)
- Dual-process theories in social psychology — Chaiken, S. & Trope, Y. (1999)
CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION
Source texts
- Heuristics and Biases The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, Daniel Kahneman)