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Cognitive Biases

Asperger Probability

Taleb uses the label Asperger Probability for his argument that rigid systematizing can obscure differences in knowledge and exposure to extreme events. His financial anecdote does not establish a clinical link between autism and risk blindness.

THE IDEA

Asperger Probability

Taleb argues that an objective Black Swan, identical for every observer, overlooks differences in what observers know. He connects this argument with faculties called "theory of mind" and "folk psychology." Dr. John, an illustration from his earlier discussion, appears in Chapter 9.

He introduces a test under the label "false-belief task." One child puts a toy under the bed and leaves. Another moves it to a box. Asked where the returning child will look, the subject must distinguish the toy’s actual location from the location the absent child believes it has. The example concerns reasoning about another person’s information; it does not by itself establish a diagnosis or an inability to manage risk.

Taleb draws on Simon Baron-Cohen’s distinction between systematizing and empathizing, then extends it to occupations and financial judgment. His claims about autism, ambiguity, sex, and professional aptitude are broader than the evidence presented in this passage.

He describes academics as "Locke's madmen" in Chapter 17. He acknowledges that he has not seen a formal direct test of the proposed connection, apart from an analysis he and George Martin made in 1998. In their tracked sample, he reports, all finance and quantitative-economics professors who entered hedge-fund trading took positions exposed to extreme losses, compared with between one third and one half of nonprofessors. He singles out "Nobel" laureates Myron Scholes and Robert C. Merton and the crisis at Long Term Capital Management.*

This trading anecdote concerns a selected group and their investment positions. It does not establish that autism causes risk blindness or that a profession identifies a clinical condition. The practical question is whether a decision-maker understands the limits of a model and considers risks outside it.

When to use it

  • Assessing risk-management candidates through their reasoning about model limits, alternative scenarios, and uncertainty.

  • Evaluating investment strategies that explicitly account for extreme tail events.

  • Teaching children perspective-taking to improve decision-making in uncertain environments.

  • Designing organizational feedback loops that surface diverse perspectives to avoid Black Swan blindness.

FROM THEORY TO EVERYDAY LIFE

In practice

01

False-Belief Task

A child sees a toy moved from under a bed to a box while another child is absent. Answering that the returning child will look under the bed distinguishes the returning child’s belief from the toy’s actual location.

02

Academic Hedge Fund Managers

Taleb cites the losses at Long Term Capital Management as an example of sophisticated models failing to account adequately for extreme risks. That example does not establish a diagnosis or explain the managers’ behavior through autism.

✳

A MOMENT TO REFLECT

Put it to work.

  1. What evidence would be needed to test a proposed connection between a style of reasoning and financial risk judgment?

  2. How can a team check whether its members are assuming that everyone has the same information?

  3. Can you recall a situation where ignoring others' perspectives led to a poor outcome? How could it have been avoided?

Connected ideas

Another lens can bring the same problem into focus.

CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION

Source texts

  • The Black Swan The Impact of the Highly Improbable With a new section On Robustness and Fragility (Nassim Nicholas Taleb)
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