Applying the Wrong Normative Model

APPLYING THE WRONG NORMATIVE MODEL

The possibility of incorrect norm application arises because psychologists must appeal to the normative models of other disciplines (e.g., statistics, logic) in order to interpret the responses on various tasks, and these models must be applied to a particular problem or situation. Matching a problem to a normative model is rarely an automatic or clear cut procedure. Indeed, it has been claimed that psychologists have invoked inappropriate normative standards in the random number generation literature (Lopes, 1982), in the work on base rate use in Bayesian reasoning (Birnbaum, 1983), in the overconfidence literature (Gigerenzer (1991a, 1991b, 1993)), with respect to the conjunction effect in probability judgment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), and in labeling performance in opinion prediction experiments a so-called false consensus effect (Dawes, 1989, 1990).

The complexities involved in matching problems to norms make possible the argument that the gap between the descriptive and normative occurs because psychologists are applying the wrong normative model to the situation. It is a potent strategy for the Panglossian theorist to use against the advocate of Meliorism and such claims have become quite common in critiques of the heuristics and biases literature: “many critics have insisted that in fact it is Kahneman and Tversky, not their subjects, who have failed to grasp the logic of the problem” (Margolis, 1987, p. 158); “if a ‘fallacy’ is involved, it is probably more attributable to the researchers than to the subjects” (Messer & Griggs, 1993, p. 195); “in the examples of alleged base rate fallacy considered by Kahneman and Tversky, they, and not their experimental subjects, commit the fallacies” (Levi, 1983, p. 502); “Perhaps the only people who suffer any illusion in relation to cognitive illusions are cognitive psychologists” (Ayton & Hardman, 1997, p. 45).